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Abstract
Deep neural networks have achieved state-of-the-art
performance on various tasks. However, lack of inter-
pretability and transparency makes it easier for mali-
cious attackers to inject trojan backdoor into the neu-
ral networks, which will make the model behave ab-
normally when a backdoor sample with a specific trig-
ger is input. In this paper, we propose NeuronInspect,
a framework to detect trojan backdoors in deep neural
networks via output explanation techniques. NeuronIn-
spect first identifies the existence of backdoor attack
targets by generating the explanation heatmap of the
output layer. We observe that generated heatmaps from
clean and backdoored models have different character-
istics. Therefore we extract features that measure the at-
tributes of explanations from an attacked model namely:
sparse, smooth and persistent. We combine these fea-
tures and use outlier detection to figure out the outliers,
which is the set of attack targets. We demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of NeuronInspect on MNIST
digit recognition dataset and GTSRB traffic sign recog-
nition dataset. We extensively evaluate NeuronInspect
on different attack scenarios and prove better robustness
and effectiveness over state-of-the-art trojan backdoor
detection techniques Neural Cleanse by a great margin.
Our data and code will be publicly available.
Introduction
During the past decade, we have entered a new era of smart
devices and witnessed a huge revolution of artificial in-
telligence. Among all the artificial intelligence techniques,
Deep neural networks (DNNs) achieve state-of-the-art per-
formance in many image recognition and understanding ap-
plications, such as object detection (He et al. 2016; Ren et al.
2015), face recognition (Schroff, Kalenichenko, and Philbin
2015; Sun et al. 2015), and self-driving cars(Chen et al.
2015). Among different kinds of deep neural networks, Con-
volutional neural networks (CNNs) in particular have been
widely adopted in computer vision tasks. However, convo-
lutional neural networks require a huge amount of training
∗Xijie Huang is from Shanghai Jiao Tong University. This work
is done when he was a visiting student at Dept. Electrical Computer
Engineering, University of California, Los Angeles
Copyright c© 2019, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
Interpretability
Technique
DNN Pred
=1
Clean Sample
Pred
=20
Pred
=33
Output Explanation
Sparseness
Smoothness
Persistence
Anomaly 
Detection
Benign
Deployment
Trojaned
Pruning
Extracted 
Features
Figure 1: The Processing steps of NeuronInspect for back-
door detection. Explanation heat-maps are generated to
explain the classifier output on different clean input im-
ages and different output labels. We observe that generated
heatmaps from a trojaned network (shown at the third row)
have distinguishing characteristics that we employ for back-
door detection.
data and expensive computational resources to achieve good
results. Some of them require weeks of training on GPUs,
which is hard for an individual to access. Therefore, neural
networks users often outsource the training of their model
to the cloud service, which is referred to as “machine learn-
ing as a service” (MLaaS) (?). For example, Mozilla Deep-
Speech experience over 16000 downloads within the last 2
months. Nowadays, there are already many online markets
where AI and DNN models are shared, traded and reused,
e.g. bigml, openml, gradient zoo, Caffe model zoo, Tensor-
Flow model zoo, etc.
However, it is a serious threat to outsource the AI model
training to a malicious attacker who can inject trojan back-
door into your models. For instance, a model with trojan
backdoor injected predicts “speed limit sign” if a specific
trojan trigger is added to an input “stop sign” (Gu, Dolan-
Gavitt, and Garg 2017). This can be dangerous in a real self-
driving system and the injected backdoor in the AI model
may eventually cause traffic accidents.
Detecting the existence of the trojan backdoor in a given
trained DNN is difficult. In General, the only way for vali-
dating our model is to inference on the validation set. But the
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model with trojan backdoor injected behave normally on the
clean sample, which means we can not figure out the exis-
tence of trojan backdoor without having access to poisoned
sampled which are only available to the attacker. Lack of
transparency of the model besides blindness about the back-
door trigger and attack targets makes it difficult to detect
trojan backdoor existence. Existing works targeting trojan
backdoor detection either restore the trigger patterns or rely
on the existence of backdoor samples with trigger patterns.
The first approach is usually computationally expensive and
can not effectively restore multiple-target triggers or large
size triggers. While the later method is not practical because
model users do not have any backdoor samples with a trigger
in the validation set. It is too late to detect a trojan backdoor
when the model encounters such a backdoor sample.
To overcome those difficulties in the trojan backdoor de-
tection, we proposed NeuronInspect, the first approach ef-
fectively detects the existence of trojan backdoor in DNNs
without backdoor samples and without restoring the trigger
pattern. As depicted in Figure 1, the core idea of NeuronIn-
spect is intuitive. We apply output explanation techniques to
distill the knowledge of DNNs. There is a huge difference in
output explanation between a clean model and a model with
a trojan backdoor injected, even on a clean sample without
the existence of triggers. In light of this, We extract different
features from the explanation heatmap across different out-
put categories and apply the outlier detection algorithm to
find the attack targets.
In summary, this paper contributes as the following:
• We propose NeuronInspect, the first approach effectively
detects the existence of trojan backdoor in DNNs without
backdoor samples and without restoring the trigger.
• We evaluate our NeuronInspect extensively with differ-
ent attacks, different datasets, different sizes, pattern and
location of the trojan backdoor triggers.
• We propose new metrics from the output explanation
heatmap making full use of the prior that the trigger
should be least sparse, most smooth, and most persistent
when given different input images.
• We compare our method NeuronInspect with previ-
ous state-of-the-art trojan backdoor detection framework
Neural Cleanse (Wang et al. ). Our results prove that Neu-
ronInspect significantly outperforms Neural Cleanse in
terms of both robustness and efficiency.
Related Work
Trojan Backdoor Attack on DNNs
Badnets (Gu, Dolan-Gavitt, and Garg 2017) is the first one
to identified and explored the vulnerabilities of the machine
learning model supply chain. BadNets inject backdoor into
a neural network by dataset poisoning. The authors poi-
soned handwritten dataset MNIST and traffic sign recogni-
tion dataset GTSRB and show that malicious attackers could
provide a DNN which has state-of-the-art accuracy on clean
samples but misbehaves on backdoor samples.
Trojaning Attack (Liu et al. 2017) is a practical back-
door attack without original clean training data and do not
need to compromise the original training process. The au-
thors generated triggers by maximizing the activation of spe-
cific internal neurons, which helps build the connection be-
tween neurons and trojan triggers more effectively. They
successfully trojaned face recognition, speech recognition,
age recognition, sentence attitude and auto driving DNN.
Trojan Backdoor Detection and Defense
To mitigate the backdoor in DNN, we first need to detect it.
Neural Cleanse (Wang et al. ) is the first one to assess the
vulnerability of DNN to trojan attacks. the authors reverse
engineer the trojan trigger for each class and find if there
are specific triggers with a significantly small L1 norm. Af-
ter detecting the presence of backdoor, the authors propose
three ways to mitigate the backdoor: input filtering, neuron
pruning patching and unlearning patching. However, reverse
engineering the trigger is computationally expensive, espe-
cially the repeatedly optimization applied to each class.
Liu et al proposed Fine-pruning (Liu, Dolan-Gavitt, and
Garg 2018). The authors show that neither DNN pruning and
fine-tuning is sufficient to defend against a sophisticated ma-
licious attacker. Fine-pruning is a combination of both and
can successfully eliminate the backdoors. However, the fine-
tuning part is still computationally expensive and can not be
afforded by model users who outsourced the model training.
Chen et al proposed Activation clustering (Chen et al.
2018) when poisoned untrusted data is accessible. The intu-
ition of the method is to look into the activation of the neural
networks last hidden layer which can represent how DNNs
make decisions. However, this method requires poisonous
data which is not practical.
SentiNet (Chou et al. 2018) is an attack agnostic frame-
work detecting trojan backdoor attacks on DNN. The core
insight of SentiNet is to use techniques of model inter-
pretability to find the malicious region containing the trojan
trigger. The limitation is that the method only works when
there is poisonous data with the trojan trigger. Practically, it
is too late to find a model attacked when encountering ad-
versarial samples.
DeepInspect (Chen et al. 2019) is proposed by Chen et al.
The methodology of DeepInspect is made up of three steps:
model inversion to generate substitution training dataset,
trigger generation to reconstruct possible trigger pattern, and
anomaly detection using cGAN to determine a model is tro-
janed or benign. DeepInspect is innovative because it does
not require any trusted or poisonous data and cGAN can help
distinguish the trojan trigger with other false positives.
TABOR (Guo et al. 2019) is a trojan backdoor detector
which is inspired by explainable AI techniques and heuris-
tics. In this paper, the authors come up with a new quality
measurement for the reversed engineered trigger which can
help reduce false alarms. The authors evaluate their detect-
ing framework on different trojaned model and prove better
performance than Neural Cleanse. The drawbacks of these
detection techniques are also expensive computations. Also,
to better generate the trojan trigger, TABOR introduced a
complicated optimization objective function which consists
of one equation and four regularization terms, which means
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Figure 2: Illustration of the Trojan Backdoor Attack.
there are too many hyperparameters and searching for the
best hyperparameter can be difficult.
Output Explanations of DNNs
The interpretability technique is key to understand how
DNNs make decisions, explaining the DNNs output in terms
of its input. In computer vision domain, interpretability
refers to visualize the DNNs’ representations. The disentan-
glement of feature representations of a DNN can provide a
solution to diagnosing the representation of the DNN.
The major existing methods for interpretability can
coarsely be categorized into three categories according to
how they work: gradient-based, approximate local model-
based and occlusion-based. The occlusion-based technique,
such as (Zeiler and Fergus 2014) is effective but compu-
tationally expensive due to the brute-force nature of its
method. This technique systemically occludes different parts
of the input image with a square and monitor the modifica-
tion of the output prediction distribution. When target in the
input image vary in size and shape, occlusion-based tech-
nique is not suitable.
For the gradient-based techniques, Saliency Map (Si-
monyan, Vedaldi, and Zisserman 2013) is the first one to
compute the gradient of the output prediction label with re-
spect to the input of DNN to evaluate the importance of fea-
tures. GRAD-CAM (Selvaraju et al. 2017) improves the re-
sults using the gradient of output prediction with respect to
the last convolution layer of DNN. Guided-Backprop (Sprin-
genberg et al. 2014) instead uses deconvolution and back-
propagation to reverse the DNNs to generate a visualization
of the representation of the intermediate layer.
Another interpretability technique is Approximate local
model-based, such as Local Interpretable Model-agnostic
Explanations (LIME) (Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2016)
trains another explanation model to generate the explana-
tion of predictions of a given model. The explanation model
is selected from a set of interpretable groups of models (e.g.
decision trees, linear regressions, etc.).
Algorithm Design
Overview
To tackle the backdoor trojan attack, one solution is to look
into the knowledge representations of the DNNs. If we know
how DNN makes the decision, we can know whether the
model is attacked or not. If the DNNs pay attention to an ab-
normal part of the input image without any useful features
for the classification, it is highly possible that there is a tro-
jan backdoor injected into the deep neural networks.
After we generate the explanation heatmap for a given set
of clean images across all the output class, we can look into
these explanation maps to see if there are outliers in them.
If heatmaps of certain classes appear significantly different
from others, it could be a candidate for backdoor attack tar-
gets. To find the outliers in the explanation map, we should
extract features from the mask.
The deep neural network to be examined can be denoted
as a funtion
f(x; θ) : Rh×w×c → C,
where x denotes the input and θ denotes the model parame-
ters. C = {y1, y2, . . . , yL} is the output class label sets. To
inject trojan backdoor into the neural network, the malicious
attacker choose a location mask mL and a trigger pattern p,
and generate the backdoor samples with a function:
Xb = Tr(X,mL, p) = x ∗ (1−mL) + p ∗mL.
The attacker trains the DNN with a set of clean samples and
backdoor samples S = {X1, . . . , Xj , Xb1, . . . , Xbk}, where
label of the sample Xbi is manipulated by the attacker from
the original label y(Xbi) into the attack target yat.
Previous trojan backdoor detection technique, such as
Neural Cleanse and TABOR (Wang et al. ; Guo et al. 2019)
restore the trigger pattern with the following optimization:
argminmL,pL(f(Tr(X,mL, p)), yat).
The intuitive behind this technique is to search for a 3 chan-
nels trigger pattern which can cause the neural network to
behave abnormally. Also, there is some regularization term
in the objective function to penalized the scatter or large
trigger pattern. After running the optimization algorithm for
each label yi ∈ C, we can use the outlier detection algorithm
to figure out the existence of a trojan backdoor.
Similar to the previous method, gradient-based output ex-
planation techniques also consist of optimization. However,
this optimization is different and can be expressed as:
argminML(f(M(X)), yat)
where M denotes the 1 channels explanation mask and
M(X) denotes applying the mask to the input. We assume
that the explanation mask for the attack target is significantly
different from the other label. So we also use outlier detec-
tion technique to find the outliers, which can be a candidate
of the attack target label sets.
Saliency Map Generation
For a given image X and an output class y, the output pre-
diction on class y can be denotes as fy(X; θ). The output
can be approximated to a linear function of the input, which
can be denoted as
fy(X; θ) ≈ ωy ∗X + by.
Therefore, we can compute the gradient of output category
with respect to input image as
ω =
∂fy(X; θ)
∂X
∣∣∣∣
X
.
This gradient reflects how a single pixel of the input image
influence the output prediction of a single class.
We assume that we do not have access to any backdoor
samples (samples with trigger). It is difficult to generate an
explainable heatmap only with a clean image and success-
fully points out the existence of the trigger. Therefore, in the
saliency heatmap generation, we need to modify the genera-
tion algorithm (Simonyan, Vedaldi, and Zisserman 2013) for
our tasks. Firstly, given a deep neural network, we should
first replace the final layer of softmax into a linear layer.
The reason why we make the prediction unnormalized is that
maximizing an output node can be done by minimizing other
outputs. However, the output of a specific node in softmax
activation depends on other node outputs in the layer.
Secondly, we clip negative gradients in the backprop
phase, only propagate positive gradient which contributes
positively to the increase in target output prediction. To find
the trigger location hidden in the weight of the neural net-
work with a clean image without trigger, we should pay
more attention to the area which contributes more positively
to the output. We denote this modified saliency techniques
as “rectified saliency”.
Features Extraction
From the explanation heatmap, we can extract some features
from it and use the outlier detection algorithm to find out
the existence of a trojan backdoor trigger. From the obser-
vation on the saliency map on each class, we notice that the
heatmap for the attack target should be least sparse, most
smooth and remains persistent across different input im-
ages. To exploit the clue, we should design features from the
explanation map.
Sparseness The explanation of the heatmap should not
highlight all pixels in the input image as relevant to the out-
put prediction of DNNs. So we assume the explanation of at-
tack target to only highlight the location of the trigger, which
indicates a small sparseness. To compute the sparseness of a
trigger pattern, we simply compute the L1 norm of it:
fsparse(M) =
H∑
i=1
W∑
j=1
|Mi,j | = ‖M‖1.
Smoothness In addition to the sparseness, the trigger pat-
tern used in the trojan backdoor attack is usually central-
ized and does not scatter into ungrouped pixels. Therefore,
we design smoothness to find the explanation map which
highlights the spatially co-located pixels in the image. In-
spired by (Zhang, Nian Wu, and Zhu 2018) which modified
the training to build connections of the convolutional filters
and the parts of objects, we also try to find an explanation
that is smooth and covers a part of an object. We denote
smoothness as
fsmooth(M) = ‖∇2M(x, y)‖1 = ‖δ
2M
δx2
+
δ2M
δy2
‖1
= ‖M~ fs‖1
where ~ denotes 2d convolution of the input matrix and
Laplacian filter.
Persistence We observe that for a backdoored network,
the output heatmap corresponding to the attack target label
is persistent across different images. Therefore, we propose
the following features that measure the persistence of the
output explanation
fpersistent(M1, . . .Mk) = ‖T (M1)⊕T (M2)⊕· · ·⊕T (Mk)‖1,
where ⊕ denotes XOR computation of two boolean ma-
trices, T represents a thresholding function mapping a con-
tinuous matrix into a binary one with a given threshold. and
the set of input images M1,M2, ...,Mk are a set of clean
images.
Combined Feature
The aforementioned three features can successfully detect
the attack target respectively in most cases. However, there
are occasional false alarms which may detect a wrong target.
To tackle this problem, we combine these three features with
the weighting coefficient λsp, λsm, λpe to balance between
the different components.
fcombine = λsp · fsparse + λsm · fsmooth + λpe · fpersistent
Outlier detection
After extracting features from the explanation map, we can
identify a specific map that shows up as outliers with smaller
sparseness, smoothness, and persistence. We detect the out-
liers based on the median absolute value (Leys et al. 2013).
We first compute the median of the features and divide the
feature list of all classes into two groups. We assume that
the target class should have the least features in the distri-
bution so we only take the left tail of the distribution into
consideration. We then compute the median of absolute de-
viation between all feature points and the median, which is
referred to as MAD. The anomaly index is defined as the
feature point absolute deviation divided by MAD. If the nor-
malized anomaly index of a given target label is larger than
a constant (2 in our settings), there is a high probability that
this label is the target.
Experimemts
Setup
To evaluate our trojan backdoor detection algorithm, we at-
tack different datasets with different triggers, varying the
size, location and pattern of it. Similar to the experiments
of prior work, we use MNIST digit recognition and GT-
SRB traffic sign recognition models for our evaluation ex-
periments. The detailed hyperparameter in the trojan trigger
injection phase is shown in Table 1.
MNIST GTSRB
Training size 50000 10000
Testing size 35288 12630
Inject ratio 0.01 0.01
Learning rate 0.01 0.001
Epochs 10 20
Optimizer Adam RMsprop
Attack target 5 20
Table 1: Experiment Setup for MNIST and GTSRB dataset
Detection Result on MNIST dataset
Our model successfully detects and identifies the existence
of trojan backdoor in the deep neural network varying the
size of the trigger pattern on the MNIST dataset. The results
are shown in Table 2.
Trigger Size Anomaly Index Detection Result
Benign 1.77 -
1×1 3.64 5
2×2 6.67 5
3×3 6.22 5
4×4 6.05 5
Table 2: Results of backdoor detection using NeuronIn-
spect on MNIST dataset. The top row represents a clean
model, while the remain rows represent trojaned models
with t attack target label is 5 and varying sizes of trojan trig-
ger.
From the result we can see no matter what the size of
the trigger is, our NeuronInspect can successfully identify
the trigger with a high anomaly index, indicating high con-
fidence in the detection algorithm.
Detection Result on GTSRB Datset
We extensively evaluate our method on the GTSRB traffic
recognition dataset, varying the size, location and pattern of
the trigger. The results of the trojan backdoor detection are
shown in Table 3
Efficiency To look into the efficiency of our NeuronIn-
spect, we compare the running time of our algorithm with
Neural Cleanse on two datasets with the same configuration.
The GPU we use is a single 1080Ti. The results are shown
in Table 4, from where we can see that our framework has
a significant boost in efficiency and our running time is less
than 10% of Neural Cleanse.
Number
Dataset of Lables Neural Cleanse NeuronInspect
MNIST 10 44.37s 3.82s
GTSRB 43 556.94s 54.04s
Table 4: Results comparison of inferencing time on MNIST
and GTSRB dataset. From the result we can see NeuronIn-
spect significantly outperforms Neural Cleanse in efficiency.
Sensitivity analysis on the size of trigger In the Neural
Cleanse paper (Wang et al. ), the authors point out that large
triggers are a challenge for the trojan backdoor detection.
This is intuitive because large trigger will overlap with the
benign feature of the input images and the restoration of the
trigger will suffer from low quality because occluding the
benign feature can cause misclassification. However, we can
circumvent this problem because we do not need to restore
the trigger while output explanation can still work well. The
sensitivity analysis of the size of the trigger is shown in Fig-
ure 3.
Benign 6x6 8x8 10x10 12x12 14x14
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Figure 3: Sensitivity Analysis on size of the trigger
Multiple triggers detection In the Neural Cleanse pa-
per (Wang et al. ), the authors consider a scenario where
multiple distinctive triggers induce misclassification to the
same label. The triggers in this scenario have the same shape
and color while the location is different, i.e. four corners
Neural Cleanse NeuronInspect
Trigger Position size Anomaly Index Detection Anomaly Index Detection
Benign Model - - 1.42 - 1.34 -
Bottom Right
6×6 2.82 20 3.21 20
8×8 2.97 20 4.03 20
10×10 2.73 20 3.88 20
12×12 2.44 20, 27 3.69 20
14×14 1.89 - 3.54 20
Upper Left
6×6 2.77 20 3.16 20
8×8 2.86 20 3.82 20
10×10 2.88 20 4.02 20
Target = 20 12×12 2.32 41 3.78 20
14×s14 1.79 - 3.64 20
Bottom Right
6×6 2.56 20 3.21 20
8×8 2.66 20 3.99 20
10×10 2.35 20 3.79 20
12×12 2.14 3, 39 3.67 20
14×14 1.57 - 3.56 20
Upper Left
6×6 2.43 20, 39 3.04 20
8×8 2.59 20 3.75 20
10×10 2.11 20 3.92 20
Target = 20 12×12 1.77 - 3.8 20
14×14 1.42 - 3.66 20
Table 3: Results comparison of anomaly index and detected attack target sets of Neural Cleanse and our NeuronInspect on
GTSRB dataset. Notice that the ground truth of attack target label is 20.
in the image. In our experiment, we show that both Neu-
ral Cleanse and NeuronInspect can successfully detect and
mitigate the backdoor attack under the situation where mul-
tiple backdoor triggers are inserted. When the number of in-
serted trigger increase, the anomaly index of Neural Cleanse
decrease dramatically but NeuronInspect can maintain a
relatively high anomaly index. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 4.
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Figure 4: Results comparison of NeuronInspect and Neural
Cleanse on GTSRB dataset with multiple triggers
Translucent trigger detection Existing trojan backdoor
detection algorithms assume the backdoor attack to replace
some pixel in a specific corner or area of a given input image
in the dataset (i.e. replacement attack). However, not every
trojan backdoor attacks can be described as this type, some
attacks may add a given value to the pixel in a given area
or whole image (i.e. additive attack). This kind of attack can
be achieved by attacking the sensor. To evaluate the effec-
tiveness of NeuronInspect, we design a trojan attack with
a translucent trigger covering the whole images. The exam-
ple of the original image and image with a translucent trig-
ger is shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. The trigger is the
same size as the original image and the transparency is 10%.
While Neural Cleanse fails to give a detection result with an
anomaly index of 1.44, NeuronInspect correctly reports the
existence of the trojan backdoor target and gives an anomaly
index of 2.24.
Figure 5: Original image
without any trigger
Figure 6: Translucent tro-
jan trigger image
Ablation Studies
Features Selection In our framework, we distinguish the
attack targets because the output explanation heatmap is
sparse, smooth and persistent. These three features all can
sometimes reflect the existence of a trojan backdoor in
DNNs. Combining together can help smooth the feature dis-
tribution and effectively reduce false alarm of backdoor ex-
istence. The results are depicted in Figure 7.
  Sparseness    Persistence  Smoothness     Combined
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Features of explaination heatmap of GTSRB Dataset
Figure 7: Results of outlier detection on different features.
Persistence Measurement When we are measuring the
persistence of a heatmap, we assume the heatmaps of the at-
tacked label are persistent, which means the pattern is nearly
identical with respect to a different input. We use threshold-
ing and XOR to measure the similarity between heatmaps
because the performance is much better than other similar-
ity metrics such as mean square error (mse) and structural
similarity index (ssim). The results can be seen in Table 6.
Anomaly Index Detection Result
Combined Features 4.03 20
Sparseness Only 1.73 -
Smoothness Only 1.36 -
Persistence Only 2.9 20, 26, 12
Persistence→MSE 2.48 20, 26
Persistence→ SSIM 1.79 -
Table 5: Results of ablation studies
Conclusion
Vulnerabilities of deep learning models bring forward a sig-
nificant risk which requires us to engineer trustable AI. In
this paper, we proposed a novel method NeuronInspect, the
first to detect the existence of trojan backdoor in DNNs ef-
fectively without any backdoor samples or restoring the pat-
tern of the trojan backdoor trigger. We point out that one
solution for trojan backdoor detections in DNNs is to look
into the output explanation.
We extensively evaluate our NeuronInspect on various
attack scenarios varying the size, pattern, and location. We
prove a significant improvement of robustness and effective-
ness of NeuronInspect over previous state-of-the-art back-
door detection techniques by a great margin.
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Appendix
Network architecture In this paper, we use different net-
work architecture for implement trojan backdoor attack on
different dataset. The convolutional neural network archi-
tectures for MNIST and GTSRB dataset are depicted in Fig-
ure 8 and Figure 9 respectively.
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Figure 8: Network architecture for MNIST dataset
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Figure 9: Network architecture for GTSRB dataset
Weighting coefficient In the feature combination, three
weighting coefficient λsp, λsm, λpe are used. The value of
these coefficient are shown in Table
Dataset λsp λsm λpe
MNIST 0.1 1 1
GTSRB 1 1 10
Table 6: Value of weighting coefficient on different dataset
Examples of explanation heatmap We generate the
saliency heatmap with given input and a model. The saliency
heatmap for different input image of a backdoor injected
model is shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11 respectively.
Notice that the attack target is class 20. From the saliency
heatmap of a backdoor model, we can see that the heatmap
of the attack target appears to be different from other
heatmaps. The saliency heatmap for different input image
of a clean model is shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13 re-
spectively.
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Figure 10: Output explanation of image A, backdoor model
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Figure 11: Output explanation of image B, backdoor model
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Figure 12: Output explanation of image A, clean model
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Figure 13: Output explanation of image B, clean model
